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1.  Introduction
Several facts have recently drawn public attention to the work and functioning of
credit rating agencies. First and foremost was their failure to predict the Asian crisis and
a wave of corporate scandals such as Enron, WorldCom, or Parmalat. Second was the
potential procyclicality of their assessments and their increasing role in the regulatory
mechanism of financial markets (Basel Committee, 2004). Third have been a number of
issues related to the transparency and integrity of the rating process (Securities and
Exchange  Commission,  2003;  European  Commission,  2004).  Among  these  issues,  the
practice of  unsolicited ratings has  prompted  controversy among  issuers,  credit rating
agencies, and regulators alike. Unsolicited ratings are formally defined as “ ratings that
credit rating agencies conduct without being formally engaged to do so by the issuer”
(International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2003). As such, and contrary to
solicited ratings, unsolicited ratings do not imply the payment of a rating fee and do not
involve  any  formal  meetings  between  the  credit  rating  agency  and  the  entity  being
rated.
1 These meetings typically provide an opportunity for credit rating agencies to get
an  overview  of  a  company’ s  activities  and  to  obtain  more information  than  what  is
disclosed in its published annual reports.
2
  The  main  concern  surrounding  unsolicited  ratings  is  the  fact  that  they  “ do  not
appear  to  be  empirically  as  favorable  as  solicited  ratings”   (Securities  and  Exchange
Commission, 2005). Even though this could be interpreted as evidence that unsolicited
ratings are assigned to “ blackmail”  issuers into paying for a solicited rating, it could also
simply indicate that better- quality issuers request a rating or that credit rating agencies
issue more conservative ratings in the absence of non- public information.
  This  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  on  unsolicited  ratings  by  investigating
whether there is a difference between Fitch’ s solicited and unsolicited bank ratings and,
if so, why. The analysis makes use of bank ratings assigned in Asia, i.e., the only region
for which a significant portion of Fitch’ s bank ratings are unsolicited. After confirming a
systematic  difference  between  unsolicited  and  solicited  ratings  for  similar  banks,  the
paper tests two hypotheses. The first is the “ self- selection hypothesis” , which states that
1  Golin  (2001)  insists  that  credit  rating  agencies  conducting  unsolicited  ratings  nevertheless
attempt  to  invite  the  participation  of  the  rated  entity,  either  through  submission  of
questionnaires, informal visits, or informal reviews of the draft report.
2 Fight (2001) reports excerpts of a survey conducted by Cantwell & Company which indicate
that more than 90% of companies release either selected or substantial non- public information to
their rating agency during these meetings.2
solicited ratings tend to be higher than unsolicited ones because they are the result of
self- selection, i.e., better- quality issuers self- select into the solicited group by choosing to
obtain rating services. This hypothesis is tested using a treatment effect model and an
endogenous  switching  regression model,  both  of  which extend the  standard  model  of
sample selection due to Heckman (1979).
A rejection of the self- selection hypothesis is consistent with at least two different
interpretations: unsolicited ratings are lower to “ punish”  issuers who otherwise would
not purchase ratings coverage; alternatively, unsolicited ratings are lower because they
are based only on public information and, as a result, tend to be more conservative than
solicited ratings. The latter gives rise to the second hypothesis tested by the paper: the
“ public disclosure hypothesis” , which states that issuers who choose not to request a
rating and who disclose a low amount of information receive a lower rating than do
similar  issuers  who  have  solicited  a  rating.  However,  a  high  enough  amount  of
information  disclosure  may  eliminate  the  difference  between  solicited  and  unsolicited
ratings.
3 In this paper, information disclosure is measured by an index capturing the level
of accounting information released by issuers.
Interestingly,  the  importance  of  information  disclosure  for  nonfinancial  firms  has
recently become the focus of several empirical papers. Milton (2002) and Baek et al.
(2002)  find  that  East  Asian  firms  which  had  indicators  of  higher  disclosure  quality
(American depository receipt and/or auditors from one of the Big Six accounting firms)
experienced better stock price performance during the financial crisis of 1997- 98. Jorion
et al. (2005) find for the U.S. that the stock price effect of rating changes has been larger
since  the  implementation  of  Regulation  Fair  Disclosure,  which  prohibits  public
companies from disclosing non- public information to favoured investment professionals,
except to credit rating agencies. Finally, Yu (2005) shows that U.S. firms with higher
perceived accounting transparency tend to have lower credit spreads. In addition, Yu
(2005) also finds that firms improve their credit rating by 0.5 notches on a 1 to 20 rating
scale by elevating their disclosure quality above the median disclosure index.
Given the importance of information disclosure for nonfinancial firms, one should
expect disclosure to play at least as important a role for banks. Indeed, several studies
suggest that banks are inherently more opaque than nonfinancial firms. For instance,
3 Thus, the public disclosure hypothesis assumes that credit rating agencies view public and non-
public  information  as  partial  substitutes  for  each  other.  This is  not  unrealistic.  For instance,
Heflin et al. (2003) and Bailey et al. (2003) find that Regulation Fair Disclosure had little effect
on the forecast accuracy of equity analysts. They interpret this result as evidence that analysts
offset the loss of non- public information by relying on improved public information.3
Morgan (2002) reports that Moody’ s Investors Service Inc. (Moody’ s) and Standard and
Poor’ s (S&P) disagree more often over banks’  and insurance companies’  ratings than
over other types of firms’  ratings and that Moody’ s is systematically more conservative
than S&P in its ratings, and relatively more so for banks. The latter finding can be
explained by the fact that the opacity of banks’  assets makes the conservative rating
agency  (Moody’ s)  err  even  more  on  the  side  of  caution.
4  Berger  et  al.  (2000)  and
Deyoung et al. (2001) provide additional evidence of the importance of bank information
disclosure by showing that supervisory and bond market ratings assigned to U.S. banks
produce value- relevant information that affects the market.
In addition to the recent interest in firms’  information disclosure, several papers have
been devoted to the question of differences in solicited versus unsolicited ratings. The
existing literature on this topic can be divided into two groups of papers.
The first group of papers (Poon, 2003a; Poon, 2003b; Poon and Firth, 2005) focuses
on ratings assigned by S&P and Fitch to banks and insurance companies and finds that
unsolicited ratings are lower than solicited ones.
5 While these studies attempt to control
for sample selection, their incomplete and conflicting results make it difficult to infer
whether sample selection in credit ratings does exist and, if so, whether it is responsible
for the lower unsolicited ratings.
  The  second  group  of  papers  (Butler  and  Rodgers,  2003;  Gan,  2004)  relies  on
estimated rating fees to identify solicited and unsolicited ratings among ratings assigned
by Moody’ s and S&P to U.S. companies. Butler and Rodgers (2003) find that solicited
ratings are not higher than solicited ones and that the marginal effect of soliciting a
rating is to decrease the impact that most financial variables have on credit ratings. Gan
(2004) finds a statistically significant difference between solicited and unsolicited ratings
but no statistically significant difference between the issuers’ 'performance after a rating
has been assigned. These results lead Gan (2004) to reject the idea that issuers with
unsolicited ratings are discriminated against.
In light of the above- mentioned studies, the main contributions of this paper are the
following.  First,  this  paper  investigates  whether  there  is  a  difference  in  treatment
4 Morgan and Stiroh (2001) reach a similar conclusion when they evaluate the impact of bank
balance  sheet  composition  on  an  institution’ s  new  subordinated  debentures.  However,  a
contribution by Flannery et al. (2004) contradicts these findings and suggests that banking assets
may not be unusually opaque.
5 Poon (2003a) uses S&P’ s ratings of 265 insurance companies in 15 mostly developing countries;
Poon (2003b) considers S&P’ s ratings of 171 banks in 20 mostly developing countries; Poon and
Firth (2005)  use Fitch’ s ratings of  935 banks in 82 countries. The  latter paper is based on a
sample which includes non- Asian banks. However, Fitch does not assign unsolicited bank ratings
outside Asia (see Section 3).4
between  solicited  and  unsolicited  bank  ratings  using  a  sample  where  both  types  of
ratings are identified as such. This represents an advantage over Butler and Rodgers
(2003)  and  Gan  (2004),  who  are  unable  to  distinguish  clearly  between  solicited  and
unsolicited  ratings  in  their  analysis.  Second,  this  paper  addresses  the  issue  of  self-
selection through both the use of a treatment effect model and an endogenous switching
regression model (self- selection hypothesis). The above- mentioned studies do not, or only
imperfectly, control for sample selection. Third, this study tests whether the difference
between solicited and unsolicited ratings disappears when banks with unsolicited ratings
release a high enough amount of public information (public disclosure hypothesis). As far
as I am aware, this hypothesis has not yet been tested in the literature.
Several  results  emerge  from  the  analysis.  First,  I  find  no  evidence  that,  in
determining ratings, Fitch assigns different weights to observable bank characteristics in
the solicited and unsolicited groups. However, I do find that unsolicited bank ratings are
lower  than  solicited  ones  after  controlling  for  observable  bank  characteristics.  The
estimated difference between the two types of ratings is also economically significant, as
it averages 0.9 notches on a 1 to 9 rating scale.
On the one hand, these findings appear to give some credence to Fitch’ s claim that
the methodology for its unsolicited bank ratings is “ nearly the same”  as for its solicited
bank  ratings  (Fitch,  2001).  On  the  other  hand,  they  seemingly  contradict  Fitch’ s
assertion that there is no difference in its credit judgement of firms with unsolicited
ratings (Fitch, 2005a). In addition, they call into question the desirability of a recent
decision by Fitch to give up disclosing whether its ratings are solicited or not.
A second result is that there is no strong evidence of a sample selection problem in
bank ratings. Hence the self- selection hypothesis is rejected. Third, the results provide
support  for the  public disclosure  hypothesis.  Banks  which  disclose  a high amount  of
information  receive  better  unsolicited  ratings  than  do  similar  banks  with  unsolicited
ratings but low levels of information disclosure. Banks which do not request a rating but
which disclose a high amount of information receive ratings which are not statistically
different from the solicited ratings of similar banks.
The latter finding is important in light of the fact that the theoretical impact of
public  disclosure  on  the  relation  between  soliciting  a  rating  and  the  actual  rating
outcome  is  ambiguous.  On  the  one  hand,  the  impact  of  public  disclosure  might  be
positive if issuers who do not request a rating and who disclose a high enough amount of
public information receive the benefit of the doubt. On the other hand, the impact of
public disclosure might be negative if it adds to negative perceptions or intuitions about5
issuers who choose not to be rated. This study suggests that the first effect dominates
the second.
The results of the test of the public disclosure hypothesis are also of interest in the
particular  case  of  Fitch’ s  ratings.  A  former  official  of  Fitch’ s  BankWatch
6  has
acknowledged that “ It is true that unsolicited ratings are often more conservative than
solicited ratings. The reason is not that agencies are attempting to punish companies
that decline to pay for a rating, but that where there is doubt, the agencies will tend to
err  on  the  side  of  caution.  Correspondingly,  the  more  information  provided  to  the
agencies, the more transparent the disclosure process, the more comfort agency analysts
will feel in giving the company the benefit of the doubt (...) In the same manner, where
in  the  case  of  an  unsolicited  rating,  the  issuer  has  not  been  very  forthcoming  with
information, or places the burden of extracting that information on the agency analyst, it
is not surprising that the agency analyst will tend to err on the side of conservatism, and
properly so. As a matter of practice, less disclosure tends to be associated with higher
risk. In the context of risk assessment, disclosure is not only the means by which the
assessment  is performed, it is also  arguably a positive credit  consideration in itself” .
(Golin, 2001, pp. 534- 535).
Many market participants also appear to believe that low public disclosure explains
the  downward  bias  in  unsolicited  ratings.  For  example,  the  investment  bank  Merrill
Lynch noted that the low unsolicited ratings assigned to four major Egyptian banks by
Moody’ s  in  1997  were  mainly  due  to  “ lack  of  cooperation  regarding  non- public
information”   along  with  “ poor  transparency  of  financial  accounts”   (Egypt  State
Information Service, 1997).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the background
on unsolicited ratings. Section 3 presents the data used in the analysis. The research
methodology is described in Section 4 and the results are presented in Section 5. Section
6 concludes and offers some relevant policy implications.
2.  Background on unsolicited ratings
Over recent years, there have been many instances in which credit rating agencies
have been accused of assigning lower unsolicited ratings in order to “ blackmail”  issuers
6 BankWach is the credit rating agency which initiated the practice of unsolicited bank ratings in
Asia prior to its absorption by Fitch.6
into  paying  for  and  participating  in  a  rating  process.  A  recent  example  cited  as  an
alleged abuse of power is the series of successive downgrades of Hannover Re, one of the
world’ s  largest  reinsurance  companies,  by  Moody’ s.
7  Hannover  Re  was  initially
approached by Moody’ s in 1998 to subscribe to its rating services, but declined the offer
since it was already paying fees to S&P and A.M. Best Company (A.M.) –  a smaller
credit rating agency –  for this purpose. Despite being turned down, Moody’ s decided to
go ahead and rate Hannover Re at no charge. Although Moody’ s initial unsolicited rating
was Aa2, only one notch below that given by S&P, it was subsequently lowered to Aa3
(January  2001)  and  then  to  A2  (November  2001).  In  March  2003,  Moody’ s  further
downgraded Hannover to Baa1 while S&P and A.M. continued to give the insurance
company  a  rating  four  notches  and  two  notches  higher,  respectively.  Moody’ s  final
downgrade sparked a 10% drop in the insurer’ s stock and surprised many analysts given
that there was no new information in the public domain justifying this. Hannover Re’ s
comments  were  that  Moody’ s  decisions  were  “ pure  blackmail”   and  that  company’ s
officials had been told on many occasions that if they paid for a rating, it “ could have a
positive impact”  on the grade. Hannover Re further pointed out that, since S&P was
already making headway in Germany and throughout Europe in rating the insurance
business, Moody’ s decision to assign an unsolicited rating may have represented a fast
way to play catch- up (Wall Street Journal, 2004).
In  spite  of  the  huge  controversy  surrounding  unsolicited  ratings,  credit  rating
agencies insist on defending this practice. Their main argument is that they do not issue
higher solicited ratings to keep existing customers or lower unsolicited ratings to attract
new customers, as this would imply that they are willing to jeopardise their reputation in
order to benefit from a temporary increase in revenues (Golin, 2001). In addition, credit
rating agencies point out the following benefits of unsolicited ratings. First, unsolicited
ratings should be seen as a service to investors and market participants who frequently
make  requests  for  coverage  of  institutions  that  are  unwilling  to  undergo  the  rating
process or pay a rating fee (Basel Committee, 2003; Fitch, 2005a). Second, unsolicited
ratings prevent firms from “ rating shopping” , a practice whereby firms only request an
additional rating when they expect an improvement on their existing rating (Securities
and Exchange Commission, 2004). Third, unsolicited ratings contribute to opening up
competition among credit rating agencies as they allow smaller agencies to compete with
Moody’ s, S&P and Fitch (Basel Committee, 2001).
7 For a review of other alleged abuses of power, see Hill (2001).7
  In  fact,  even the  Big  Three  credit  rating agencies  originally  relied  on unsolicited
ratings to develop their activities. Prior to the 1970s, they used to charge bondholders a
fee  for  obtaining  rating  information  and  thereby  provided  unsolicited  rather  than
solicited ratings. The shift to a business model that charged issuers for the privilege of
obtaining a rating occurred mainly because of the spread of low- cost photocopying and
the desire of issuers to reassure investors of the quality of their issuances (White, 2001).
However, in 1991, Moody’ s reintroduced the practice of unsolicited ratings and other
rating agencies quickly followed in the mid- 1990s.
Even though the vast majority of credit ratings are still assigned on a solicited basis,
unsolicited ratings currently account for a sizeable portion of the total number of credit
ratings. According to the Cantwell survey (Fight, 2001), unsolicited ratings represented
between 6% (S&P) and 26.6% (Fitch) of the total number of credit ratings assigned in
industrial countries in 2000. In another survey conducted by Baker and Mansi (2002),
U.S. firms with unsolicited ratings averaged 10.6% of the total number of firms with a
credit rating in 1999. In Europe, the phenomenon of unsolicited ratings is believed to be
substantially  smaller  (Basel  Committee,  2000).  In  fact,  issuers  located  in  developing
countries appear to be the main targets of unsolicited ratings. Evidence from Bankscope
for instance indicates that almost 80% of S&P’ s unsolicited bank ratings were assigned in
Africa, South America, and Asia (excluding Japan) in February 2005.
Interestingly,  credit  rating  agencies  do  not  talk  about  solicited  versus unsolicited
ratings but use a softer terminology. In 1996, S&P started issuing unsolicited ratings
under the name “ public information ratings” , mainly to companies in the insurance and
banking sectors. These ratings, which appear with a “ pi”  subscript in its publications,
are assigned by broad numerical categories without a + or –  modifier, i.e., AAA, AA...
Contrary  to S&P,  Moody’ s policy  has  long refused  to disclose whether a  rating was
solicited or not. Due to market pressure, however, it finally announced in 1999 that it
would  identify,  in  its  initial  rating  assignment  announcements  only  the  unsolicited
ratings for which the issuer had declined its invitation to participate in the assignment
process (Moody’ s, 1999). Since January 2000, the following statement appears in the first
press release accompanying the assignment of an unsolicited rating by Moody’ s: “ This
rating  was  initiated  by  Moody’ s.  The  issuer  did  not  participate  in  the  assignment
process” .  Since  October  2004,  Moody’ s  has  begun  identifying  on  its  website  and  in
selected research reports any issuer that has declined its invitation to participate in the
rating process.8
Fitch, the third largest player in the credit rating industry, issues unsolicited ratings
under the name “ initiated”  (or “ shadow” ) ratings. The majority of these ratings are
assigned  in  Asia  and  have  been  introduced  to  bring  into  Fitch’ s  coverage  the  large
number  of  banks  previously  rated  by  BankWatch  (see  Section  3).  Although  Fitch’ s
policy  had  long  been  to  disclose,  both  in  its  initial  and  subsequent  publications
concerning a rating, whether this rating was paid or not, it announced in June 2005 that
it  would  henceforth  only  identify  unsolicited  ratings  as  such  in  its  initial  rating
assignment announcements and that it would not continue to disclose the solicitation
status of ratings afterwards (Fitch, 2005a). Consequently, Fitch dropped the initiated (or
shadow) subscript from all its unsolicited ratings in its publications.
Over  the  last  three  years,  unsolicited  ratings  have  come  under  the  attention  of
several regulatory bodies as part of wider investigations into the role and function of
credit rating agencies.
In 2003, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a report where
it expressed its concerns about credit rating agencies engaging in specified practices with
respect to unsolicited ratings (e.g., sending a bill for an unsolicited rating, sending a fee
schedule and “ encouraging”  payment, indicating that a rating might be improved with
the cooperation of the issuer). The SEC also mentioned that it would explore whether
only  credit  rating  agencies  that  issue  clearly  labelled  unsolicited  ratings  should  be
granted  the  status  of  Nationally  Recognized  Statistical  Rating  Organizations  (SEC,
2003).
In  2004,  the  International  Organization  of  Securities  Commissions  (IOSCO)
published a code of conduct for credit rating agencies that sets out a series of measures
that agencies should incorporate into their own codes of conduct. In particular, the code
asks  credit  rating  agencies  to  “ disclose  whether  the  issuer  participated  in  the  rating
process”  and to identify each rating not initiated at the request of an issuer as such
(IOSCO,  2004a).  Interestingly,  Fitch’ s  reply  was  that  it  did  “ not  believe  that  it  is
necessary  or  appropriate to  require the disclosure  of whether  a rating is  initiated  or
whether the issuer has cooperated in the rating process”  and that such requirements
“ interfere in the editorial process of the rating agencies”  (IOSCO, 2004b).
Finally,  the  Committee  of  European  Securities  Regulators  (CESR)  also  recently
recommended  that  credit  rating  agencies  disclose  whether  they  initiate  their  credit
ratings  and  whether  the  issuer  participates  in  the  rating  assessment  process  (CESR,
2005).9
3.  Data
The  sample  used  in  this  study  consists  of  solicited  and  unsolicited  bank  ratings
assigned by Fitch in Asia. Fitch started to issue unsolicited bank ratings in this part of
the world after its acquisition of BankWatch –  a credit rating agency specialised in the
banking sector –  in October 2000. Prior to its absorption by Fitch, BankWatch used two
types of rating scales in emerging markets, the so- called “ intra- country issuer rating”
and  “ credit  evaluation  rating”   scales.  The  latter  scale  mainly  applied  to  unsolicited
ratings  of  smaller  institutions  or  banks  in  Asia.  However,  BankWatch  did  not
systematically disclose whether its ratings were paid for or not (Golin, 2001). Following
the integration of BankWatch’ s ratings into its own rating system, Fitch announced that
ratings that were part of the credit rating evaluation scale and that were largely based
on public information would be appended with an “ s”  (shadow) in its publications. Fitch
nevertheless insisted that the methodology behind these shadow (unsolicited) ratings and
the more traditional full due diligence (solicited) ratings was almost the same and that
their definition and scale were identical (Fitch, 2001).
Fitch’ s  solicited  and  unsolicited  bank  ratings  belong  to  a  specific  class  of  credit
ratings  known  as  “ individual  ratings” .
8  These  ratings,  which  are  used  primarily  by
interbank lenders, focus on the ability of issuers to satisfy their obligations in general,
irrespective of the terms of any particular debt obligation. They thus differ from the
more well- known debt ratings, which attempt to assess the risk that an issuer will not
repay a specific security or class of securities, e.g., long- term debt. In addition, individual
ratings do not take into account external support that an issuer might receive from its
country of origin, which means in practice that they are not determined by the rating of
the issuer’ s country.
The bank individual ratings and the corresponding financial information used in the
analysis  were  obtained  from  Bankscope  and  Fitch  Research.  Specifically,  in  the
remainder of the paper, I use cross- sectional regressions where the dependent variable is
the bank individual rating on January 31, 2004. As Fitch asks for a minimum of three
years’  annual data and a maximum of five years’  when assigning a bank rating, I use the
five- year  average  (1999  to  2003)  of  bank  variables  if  available  and  their  three- year
average (2001 to 2003) if not.
8 Individual ratings are called “ financial strength ratings”  at Moody’ s and Capital Intelligence, a
smaller credit rating agency specialised in emerging market financial institutions. S&P does not
assign this type of ratings to banks. The complete definition of individual ratings can be found in
Appendix A.10
Table 1 illustrates the distribution of 169 sample bank ratings sorted by country.
Only those countries that have both solicited and unsolicited bank ratings are included
in the analysis. Among the sample countries, Taiwan, India, and Hong Kong are the
countries with the highest number of bank ratings, with respectively 39 banks (23.1% of
observations), 32 banks (18.9% of observations) and 18 banks (10.7% of observations).
Unsolicited ratings constitute the majority of bank ratings in the sample countries with
95 banks  (56.2%  of  observations).  Solicited  ratings account  for the  remainder of the
sample with 74 banks (43.8% of observations). The number of solicited and unsolicited
bank ratings is roughly equal in two countries (Hong Kong and Taiwan) while the other
sample countries have a majority of solicited ratings (Indonesia, Macau, Malaysia, the
Philippines,  and  South  Korea)  or  unsolicited  ratings  (Bangladesh,  China,  India,  and
Vietnam). Obviously, a plausible explanation for this imbalance is that banks located in
countries with weakly developed banking markets  hardly  borrow in the international
interbank market and, as a consequence, do not require an individual rating. Another
possible explanation is that banks located in countries with very different  regulatory
systems and/or accounting standards prefer to be rated by local credit rating agencies
(Poon, 2003a).
Table 2 shows the sample distribution of solicited and unsolicited bank ratings by
rating level. Note that, contrary to Fitch’ s debt ratings, which use the standard AAA to
D rating scale, Fitch’ s individual ratings are based on an A to  E classification with
intermediate categories, i.e., A/B, B/C, C/D, and D/E. The rating category with the
highest number of sample banks is the D category (40 banks or 23.7% of observations)
while no sample bank falls in the A category. Less than a third of the sample banks (49
banks or 29% of observations) obtain C ratings or above, meaning that their overall
creditworthiness is adequate to (very) strong. The remaining sample banks (120 banks or
71% of observations) are classified below C, meaning that their overall creditworthiness
is  somewhat  weak  to  very  weak.  Solicited  ratings  mostly  fall  into  the  B/C  to  D
categories whereas unsolicited ratings are concentrated in the C to E categories. The fact
that unsolicited ratings are more concentrated across the rating scale tends to confirm
the perception of many issuers that these ratings are less accurate than solicited ones
(Baker and Mansi, 2002).
In Table 3, I present summary statistics for the entire sample of 169 bank individual
ratings.  The  variables  in  the  table  were  selected  according  to  Fitch’ s  bank  rating
methodology (Fitch, 2004a), which indicates that Fitch’ s bank ratings are determined by
a  number  of  quantitative  and  qualitative  factors  that  can  be  classified  into  nine11
categories:  risk  management,  funding  and  liquidity,  capitalisation,  securitisation,
earnings and performance, market environment, diversification of business and franchise,
management and strategy, and corporate governance. Based on this classification, the
variables which exhibit the strongest correlation with Fitch’ s bank individual ratings are
reported in Table 3.
In  addition,  Fitch  also  emphasises  its  need  for  a  detailed  breakdown  of  banks’
balance  sheet  and  income  statement  when  assigning  a  rating.  This  requirement  is
captured by a  disclosure  index,  which  can be found  at the bottom of  Table 3. The
disclosure  index  is  based  on  Baumann  and  Nier  (2004)  and  records  whether  banks
disclose  information  on  17  key  balance- sheet  categories  in  Bankscope.  The  17  key
categories include 7 asset categories, 4 liabilities categories, 4 memo lines categories and
2 income statement categories. The disclosure index thus measures the level of detail
that banks provide on 17 key dimensions of accounting information in their published
accounts. Note that since Bankscope is a product of Fitch, it seems reasonable to assume
that  the  disclosure  index  accurately  reflects  all  the  accounting  information  publicly
available to this credit rating agency.
Table 4 compares the mean and standard deviation of some bank characteristics in
the solicited and unsolicited groups (the t- statistic for mean equality is given in the last
column). Banks with unsolicited ratings have better asset quality (i.e., lower impaired
loans/gross  loans)  but  are  less  liquid  and  less  capitalised  than  banks  with  solicited
ratings. The difference between the performance of the solicited and unsolicited groups
(as measured by the return on assets and the cost to income ratio) is not found to be
statistically  significant,
9  while  no  variable  related  to  the  securitisation  category  was
found in Bankscope. Banks which request a rating are more likely to have a financial
statement which is consolidated (62.2% in the solicited group vs. 44.2% in the unsolicited
group) and which has been approved by the auditors without qualification (88.3% in the
solicited group vs. 77.2% in the unsolicited group). There are more commercial banks in
the  unsolicited  group  (94.7%)  than  in  the  solicited  one  (77.0%).  Interestingly,  the
sovereign  credit  rating  and  the  diversification/franchise  variables  do  not  differ
significantly across solicited status. However, banks which choose not to be rated are
more likely to be located in communist countries, i.e., countries characterised by very
different banking systems, than banks which choose to obtain rating services (2.7% in
the solicited group vs. 22.1% in the unsolicited group). Corporate governance variables
9  Throughout  the  paper,  significance  refers  to  a  level  of  confidence  of  95%  and  marginal
significance to a level of confidence of 90%.12
also  show  that  banks  requesting  a  rating  have  a  statistically  higher  degree  of
involvement of individuals and families in their ownership (4.3% of equity owned by this
type of shareholders in the solicited group vs. 0.4% in the unsolicited group), while banks
which choose not to be rated have stronger ties to the State (28.3% of equity owned by
this type of shareholders in the unsolicited group vs. 9.1% in the solicited group). In
addition, banks rated on a solicited basis have significantly more subsidiaries (7.0) than
banks rated on an unsolicited basis (3.2). This result does not seem to proxy for a size
effect  since  the  difference  between  the  means of  the  “ total  deposits”   variable  in the
solicited  and  unsolicited  groups was not  significant. Finally,  the last  row of  Table 4
indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the level of disclosure
of  banks  with  solicited  ratings  and  the  level  of  disclosure  of  banks  with  unsolicited
ratings.
Overall, Table 2 suggests that unsolicited ratings tend to be more frequently assigned
at  the  lower  end  of  the  rating  scale  than  solicited  ones,  while  Table  4  shows  some
differences  in  the  characteristics  of  the  solicited  and  unsolicited  groups.  In  order  to
answer the question of whether there is a difference in treatment between solicited and
unsolicited  bank  ratings  and,  if  so,  to  explain  why,  I  now  turn  to  the  econometric
analysis.
4.  Methodology
  This  section  outlines  the  methodology  used  to  test  whether  banks  with  solicited
ratings and those with unsolicited ratings obtain the same rating ceteris paribus.
4.1. Ordinary least squares
I first use a simple ordinary least squares regression of the form:
i i ii Rating X Solicited , ȕ įİ = ++   (1)
where Ratingi corresponds to the individual rating of banki coded on a 9 (A) to 1 (E)
scale, Xi  is  a  matrix  of  financial  and  nonfinancial  characteristics  that  explain  the
individual rating of banki and Solicitedi is a dummy variable that equals one if bank i
has  requested  an  individual  rating  and  zero  otherwise.  Although Ratingi  takes  nine
different discrete values, it is treated as a continuous variable in the remainder of the13
analysis. Aside from simplifying the estimation of the regression models, this choice is
made for two reasons. First, researchers often treat discrete variables as continuous when
the range of values that they take is large enough and when the gaps between successive
values are equivalent (Abrevaya and Hausman, 1999). Both conditions are met in this
case since  individual  ratings are  split  into nine different  categories  and  much  of the
empirical literature assumes that credit ratings can be interpreted as cardinal values.
Second, the existing studies on the determinants of credit ratings show that this type of
analysis is not very sensitive to the choice between ordinary least squares and ordered
probit, a statistical model for discrete random variables (see, e.g., Cantor and Packer,
1997; Pottier and Sommer, 1999).
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Looking  at  equation  (1),  the  coefficient  of Solicitedi, į, measures  the  so- called
treatment effect. In this context, the treatment is whether or not banks have requested
an individual rating from Fitch. The null hypothesis to be tested is whether = 0 į , i.e.,
whether soliciting a rating has no effect on the rating itself once controlling for relevant
bank characteristics. One issue that arises in this setup is the potential endogeneity of
the variable Solicitedi i.e., the possibility that corr (Solicitedi, İi)  0, yielding biased and
inconsistent least squares estimates. For instance, if the typical bank which chooses to
request a rating would have a relatively high rating whether or not it asked to be rated,
there will  be  a  positive  correlation between Solicitedi  and i İ .  In  this  case,  the  least
squares estimates of į will actually overestimate the treatment effect. Therefore, I use
two extensions of the standard model of sample selection due to Heckman (1979) to
account for potential self- selection into solicited status.
11
4.2. Treatment effect model
The treatment effect model complements the outcome equation (1) with the following
latent model:
*
iii Solicited W u , Ȗ =+ (2)
*
ii Solicited Solicited 1  if     0, 0 otherwise, => (3)
10 As a robustness check, I also estimated equation (1) using an ordered probit model. The results,
which are shown in Table 9 (Appendix B), are very similar to those of ordinary least squares.
11 Poon (2003a) and Poon (2003b) use Heckman’ s standard model of sample selection and are
therefore unable to estimate the impact of soliciting a rating while simultaneously controlling for
the selection bias. Butler and Rodgers (2003) and Gan (2004) do not control for sample selection.14
where W collects all variables inX plus any other variables that affect the decision to
request an individual rating but not the rating itself. The model further assumes thatX
and W are exogenous and that İ and u follow a bivariate normal distribution with mean














2 is the variance of the error term in the outcome equation, u ı
2  is the variance of
the error term in the selection equation and u İ ı is the covariance between both error
terms. Since Ȗ can be estimated only up to a scale factor, it is assumed that u ı =
2 1 hence
u İİ ı ȡı =  where ȡ is the coefficient of correlation between İ and u.
Using equation (1), one can show that the expected rating conditional on having
requested one is given by:
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where f  denotes the normal density function and ĭthe normal cumulative function. For
banks with unsolicited ratings, the counterpart to (5) is:
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The difference in expected rating between banks which request a rating and those
which do not is given by the difference between equations (5) and (6):
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where the first term on the right- hand side, į, measures the treatment effect and the
second term in brackets is the hazard rate. If the latter term is omitted from equation
(1),  the  above difference  is  what is  estimated by  the  least  squares  coefficient of the
dummy variable Solicitedi. For instance, in the presence of positive self- selection (ȡ>0),
the second term in (7) is positive hence the least squares estimator of į overestimates the
treatment effect.
The treatment effect model can be consistently estimated by a standard instrumental
variable approach or by a two- step approach in the spirit of Heckman (1979). The latter
method, which is used in this study, consists in estimating a probit equation for the15
probability  of  soliciting  a  rating,  before  estimating  equation  (1) augmented with  the
hazard rate obtained from the probit equation (the standard errors of the least squares
estimates  must  be  corrected).  A  test  for 0 İ ȡı =   is  a  test  of  selection  based  on
unobservable rating determinants. If İ ȡı is not significantly different from zero, one can
reasonably decide that selectivity is not a problem and proceed to use ordinary least
squares as usual (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993).
4.3. Endogenous switching regression model
All methods examined so far are based on equation (1), which assumes that soliciting
a rating has only an intercept effect on individual ratings. However, soliciting a rating
may also have a slope effect, i.e., the coefficients of the Xs may differ according to the
solicited  status.  In  addition,  the  above  models  assume  that  the  variance  of  the
unobserved component of individual ratings is the same for banks with solicited ratings
and for banks with unsolicited ratings. A more general version of the outcome equation,
which allows for treatment heterogeneity and for error terms with different variances, is
given by:
i ii R a t i n gX ȕİ =+ 1 11 if Solicitedi = 0,   (8)
i ii R a t i n gX ȕİ =+ 2 22 if Solicitedi = 1,   (9)
where it is assumed thatX is exogenous and thatİ1, İ2 and u follow a trivariate normal



























2 are the variances of the error terms in the outcome equations, u ı
2  is the
variance of the error term in the selection equation and u ı1 and u ı2  are the covariances
between İ1 and u and İ2 and u, respectively (the covariance between the error terms in
the  outcome  equations  is  not  defined  since Rating1i  and Rating2i  are  never  observed
simultaneously). Since Ȗ can be estimated only up to a scale factor, it is assumed that
u ı =
2 1  hence 1 11 ı ȡı = uu   and 2 22 ı ȡı = uu   where 1 ȡ u and 2 ȡ u   are  the  coefficients  of
correlation between İ1 and u and İ2 and u, respectively.16
Let the decision to request a rating be generated from the same model described by
equations (2) and (3). One can show that the expected rating conditional on having
requested one is given by:
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For banks with unsolicited ratings, the counterpart to (11) is:
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The difference in expected rating between banks which request a rating and those
which do not is given by the difference between equations (11) and (12):
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where the first term on the right- hand side, Xi(ȕ2 –ȕ1), is the average treatment effect
(ATE), which measures the average gain or loss from soliciting a rating for a randomly
chosen bank (this quantity was denoted by į in the models of Sections 4.1 and 4.2).
Under fairly weak assumptions (Wooldridge, 2002), a consistent estimator of the average
treatment effect is given by:
() ˆ ˆ ˆ A T EX 21 , ȕȕ =-   (14)
where Ø is used to denote average andˆparameter estimates obtained by estimating the
system formed by equations (2)- (3) and (8)- (9).
Another quantity of interest in this model is the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT), which measures the average gain or loss from soliciting a rating for those
banks  which  have  requested  a  rating.  Formally,  the  average  treatment  effect  on  the
treated is defined as:
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where X2i denotes Xi in the group of banks with solicited ratings. A consistent estimator





ˆ W ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ A T TX
ˆ W












.   (16)17
In this setup, a test for 22 11 0 ȡı ȡı == uu  is a test of selection based on unobservable
rating determinants. If the test fails to reject that both parameters are jointly equal to
zero, we  cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  selectivity bias  in  the  solicited  and
unsolicited groups and we  have no argument against using ordinary least squares. A
Chow test can also be used to test whether the ȕs are identical in the solicited and
unsolicited groups. If they are, the treatment effect model is more efficient than the
endogenous switching regression model.
The  endogenous  switching  regression  model  is  estimated  by  maximum  likelihood
using the procedure outlined in Greene (1995).
5.  Results
  In this section, I discuss the results of the estimation procedures described above.
5.1. Ordinary least squares
Two  basic  specifications  of  equation  (1)  are  reported  in  Table  5.  To  avoid
multicollinearity  problems, the  first  specification  only includes five financial  variables
and four nonfinancial variables in addition to a solicited individual rating dummy. These
variables cover the different areas of Fitch’ s bank rating methodology: risk management
(loan  loss  provisions/net  interest  revenue),  liquidity  (net  loans/total  assets),
capitalisation  (equity/total  assets),  earnings  and  performance  (cost  to  income  ratio),
market  environment  (consolidated  statement  dummy,  communist  country  dummy),
diversification/franchise (log of total deposits), corporate governance (bank ownership
dummy –  one if the bank is majority- owned by another bank and zero otherwise), and
public  disclosure (disclosure  index). The second specification  adds two variables that
control  for  additional aspects of  market environment (unqualified  statement  dummy)
and corporate governance (state ownership dummy –  one if the bank is majority- owned
by the State and zero otherwise). In addition, the second specification also interacts the
solicited individual rating dummy with an other individual rating dummy, which is equal
to one if the bank had an individual rating from a competitor agency – Moody’ s or
Capital  Intelligence –   before  it  obtained  an  individual  rating  from  Fitch  and  zero
otherwise. The resulting variable captures whether there is a rating difference between
banks which request an individual rating without being rated by a competitor of Fitch18
and banks which request an individual rating while being rated by a competitor agency.
Such a difference may exist if banks which are already rated by Moody’ s or Capital
Intelligence engage in rating shopping and only request an individual rating from Fitch
when they are a confident that it will be higher than their existing individual rating.
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The two specifications are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) and by two-
stage least squares (2SLS) to account for the potential endogeneity of equity/total assets
and the disclosure index, i.e., the two variables that are most likely to suffer from an
endogeneity bias (Bauman and Nier, 2004). The set of instruments for both variables
consists of the other exogenous explanatory variables in the regression. In addition to
these  variables,  I  exploit  the  cross- country  dimension  of  the  data  set  by  including
country dummies which reflect the average level of the intrumented variables in each
sample country. I also carried out a Durbin- Wu- Hausman test, the null hypothesis for
which  states  that  OLS  delivers  consistent  estimates,  i.e.,  that  instrumental  variables
techniques (2SLS) are not required. The value of the Durbin- Wu- Hausman statistic in
specifications (1) and (2) is 2.37 and 2.67, respectively, with associated probabilities of
0.31 and 0.26, meaning that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that OLS delivers
consistent estimates in both specifications. The discussion of Table 5 is therefore based
on the OLS results.
The coefficient of the solicited individual rating dummy in specifications (1) and (2)
is equal to 0.866 and 1.181, respectively, and is highly significant. This means that there
is an important premium for banks which request an individual rating once controlling
for other rating determinants. For other variables, the results appear to be standard. For
example, loan loss provisions/net interest revenue, the cost to income ratio, and the
communist country dummy negatively impact individual ratings, while higher values of
equity/total assets, the consolidated statement dummy, the bank ownership dummy, and
the  disclosure  index  are  associated  with  higher  individual  ratings.  Other  variables
common to both specifications as well as the variables added in the second specification
are not significant at the 95% level. In particular, the marginal effect that the other
individual  rating  dummy  has  on  how  individual  ratings  are  affected  by  the  solicited
individual rating dummy is zero. The statistics at the bottom of the table also indicate
that the two specifications have similar prediction rates and classify about one- third of
banks  in  the  correct  rating  category  and  about  one- half  in  the  rating  category
12  Note  that  no  bank  with  unsolicited  ratings  from  Fitch  is  rated  by  Moody’ s  or  Capital
Intelligence, which prevents analyzing whether there is a difference in the way Fitch treats banks
not soliciting a rating but having a rating from a competitor agency versus banks which have no
other rating.19
immediately above or below the actual rating. Since the variables added in specification
(2) are not or only marginally significant, I work with specification (1) from now on.
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5.2. Treatment effect model
  The coefficient of the solicited individual rating dummy in Table 5 suggests that
there is an important difference in treatment between banks which ask for a rating and
those which do not. This result confirms the findings of the studies reviewed  in the
introduction.  However, as  noted  earlier,  ordinary  least  squares  may  overestimate  the
impact of the treatment if banks which request a rating are positively self- selected. For
this reason, I proceed to use the methods described in Section 4.2 and 4.3 to correct for
the potential sample selection bias.
  Table 6 reports the  results of the treatment effect model. The first two columns
report  two- step  estimates  (Heckman,  1979)  which  treat  equity/total  assets  and  the
disclosure index as exogenous. The last two columns report two- step estimates obtained
by instrumenting equity/total assets and the disclosure index before applying the two-
step method.
14  For each method (two- step and two- step +  IV),  Table 6 reports the
results of the selection and of the outcome equations. The dependent variable in the
selection equation is the solicited individual rating dummy. The dependent variable in
the outcome equation is the bank individual rating.
For identification purposes, the selection equation must include at least one variable
that affects the decision to ask for a rating but not the rating itself. The variable which
enters the selection equation but not the outcome equation is a solicited long- term debt
rating dummy (one if the bank had a solicited long- term debt rating from Fitch before it
obtained an individual rating and zero otherwise).
15 This variable is used as an exclusion
restriction because Fitch started to issue long- term debt ratings in the 1980s, long before
individual ratings. Therefore, banks which initially requested a long- term debt rating
from Fitch should be more likely to have subsequently asked for an individual rating. At
the  same  time,  it  is  unlikely  that  paying  for  a  long- term  debt  rating influenced  the
13 I also interacted the solicited individual rating dummy with the other explanatory variables and
found that it has an intercept but no slope effect on individual ratings.
14 The instruments for equity/total assets and the disclosure index are the same as in Table 5.
Robust t- statistics are in parentheses for the two- step estimates and bootstrapped t- statistics are
in parentheses for the two- step + IV estimates.
15 For the minority of banks which obtained both types of ratings at the same time, the solicited
long- term debt rating dummy is thus equal to zero. Setting the solicited long- term debt rating
dummy to one if the bank had a solicited long- term debt rating before or at the same time it
obtained an individual rating and zero otherwise does not affect the results.20
individual rating. Since I view the decision to request an individual rating as a sequential
process (i.e., banks’  decision to buy an individual rating was influenced by their decision
for the long- term debt rating), I treat the solicited long- term debt rating dummy as a
lagged endogenous variable which does not have to be instrumented.
The  results  of  the  two- step  and  two- step  +  IV  methods  are  relatively  similar.
Therefore, I focus on the two- step results. Looking at the selection equation, the signs of
the estimates suggest that banks which are located in a non- communist country, which
publish a consolidated financial statement and which are already subscribing to Fitch’ s
long- term  rating  services  are  more  likely  to  request  an  individual  rating  than  other
banks. Interestingly, financial variables do not seem to  play a significant role in the
decision to ask for an individual rating. The statistics at the bottom of the selection
equation further indicate that the model correctly predicts the decision to request an
individual rating for slightly more than two- thirds of the sample banks. Looking at the
outcome equation, the estimates and their significance are in line with those reported in
Table 6 except for equity/total assets and the solicited individual rating dummy, which
are now only marginally significant. However, the coefficient of the hazard rate does not
differ significantly from zero, implying that there is no evidence that there is a selectivity
problem in the outcome equation. Finally, the statistics at the bottom of the outcome
equation  show  that  the  classification  accuracy  of  the  treatment  effect  model  is
comparable to that of ordinary least squares.
5.3. Endogenous switching regression model
The results so far could be due to the fact that the above models are misspecified or
too restrictive. For this reason, I consider a more general framework which allows the
parameters of the outcome equation to differ according to whether or not banks have
solicited a rating, while simultaneously controlling for sample selection.
Table 7 reports the results of the endogenous switching regression model. For clarity,
I only report the results of the outcome equations, i.e., equations (8) and (9), and the
results of the selection equation are omitted. The first two columns report maximum-
likelihood estimates (Greene, 1995) which treat equity/total assets and the disclosure
index as exogenous. The last two columns report maximum- likelihood estimates obtained
by  instrumenting  equity/total  assets  and  the  disclosure  index  before  performing  the21
maximum- likelihood estimation.
16 The dependent variable in each outcome equation is
the bank individual rating.
Looking at Table 7, three variables are significant in the first two outcome equations
and only two in the last two outcome equations. These variables have the expected sign,
i.e., higher values of loan loss provisions/net interest revenue, the cost to income ratio,
and  the  communist  country  dummy  are  negatively  related  to  Fitch’ s  assessment  of
banks’  financial strength. The statistics at the bottom of the table indicate that the
classification  accuracy  of  the  model  is  slightly  better  in  the  unsolicited  than  in  the
solicited  group.  For  clarity,  I  focus  on  the  maximum- likelihood  estimates  to  further
discuss  the  results  of  the  endogenous  switching  regression  model  (the  maximum-
likelihood + IV estimates offer similar results).
First, the average treatment effect and the average treatment effect on the treated,
which measure  respectively  the  average  gain from  soliciting  a  rating  for  a  randomly
chosen bank and the average gain from soliciting a rating for those banks which have
requested  one,  are  obtained  by  estimating  equations  (14)  and  (16).  The  average
treatment  effect  (ATE)  is  equal  to  2.177  while  the  average  treatment  effect  on  the
treated (ATT) is equal to 0.631. Bias- corrected confidence intervals based on bootstrap
replications indicate that both effects are significantly different from zero (the confidence
intervals are [2.146; 3.281] for ATE and [0.314; 1.042] for ATT).
Second, a Chow test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of individual rating
determinants are the same in the solicited and unsolicited groups was carried out. The
value of the test statistic is 1.52 with an associated probability of 0.14, meaning that one
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of individual rating determinants
are identical in both groups and that the endogenous switching regression model is less
efficient than the treatment effect model. This result contrasts with Butler and Rodgers
(2003), who find that soliciting a rating induces Moody’ s and S&P to place less weight
on rating determinants reflecting public information.
Third, an F- test of the null hypothesis that the correlation coefficients between the
error term in the selection equation and the error terms in the outcome equations are
jointly  insignificant  was  performed.  The  value  of  the  test  statistic  is  0.60  with  an
associated probability of 0.55, meaning that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that
12 and ȡȡ uu   are  both  equal  to  zero  and  that  there  is  no  selection  bias  in  individual
16 The instruments for equity/total assets and the disclosure index are the same as in Tables 5
and  6.  Robust  t- statistics  are  in  parentheses  for  the  maximum- likelihood  estimates  and
bootstrapped t- statistics are in parentheses for the maximum likelihood + IV estimates.22
ratings. Thus, the results in Table 7 (like the results in Table 6) do not support the self-
selection hypothesis and contrast with Poon (2003a), Poon (2003b), and Poon and Firth
(2005) who find evidence of sample selection in S&P’ s and Fitch’ s ratings. However, as
noted earlier, these papers use Heckman’ s standard model of sample selection and/or
different sample of credit ratings hence their results are not necessarily comparable with
those of this paper.
To sum up, the ordinary least squares regression, the treatment effect model, and the
endogenous  switching  regression  model  all  find  a  positive  and  significant  difference
between solicited and unsolicited ratings.
17 However, the treatment effect model and the
endogenous  switching  regression  model  both  fail  to  provide  evidence  for  a  sample
selection problem in individual ratings. There is thus no evidence that that these models
are more appropriate than ordinary least squares to study the determinants of bank
individual ratings. For this reason, I rely on OLS and 2SLS regressions to test the public
disclosure hypothesis, the results of which are presented in Table 8.
5.4. Test of the public disclosure hypothesis
According to the public disclosure hypothesis, banks which choose not to request a
rating and which disclose a low amount of public information receive a lower rating than
similar banks which have solicited a rating. However, banks which choose not to request
a rating and which disclose a high enough amount of public information do not receive a
lower  rating than  similar banks  which  have  solicited  a  rating.  The  public  disclosure
hypothesis is tested using a regression of the form:
i iii
i ii











where Unsolicitedi is a dummy variable equal to one if bank i has not requested a rating
and zero otherwise, and High disclosurei is a dummy variable equal to one if bank i is a
high disclosure bank and zero otherwise (the comparison group is thus the banks with
solicited ratings). In the following, high disclosure banks are defined as those having a
disclosure index equal to or higher than the 50
th percentile of the sample distribution of
disclosure indexes, but the results also hold if higher percentiles are chosen.
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17 This difference is only marginally significant in the case of the treatment effect model.
18 The results also hold if High disclosure is defined using the percentiles of the world distribution
of bank disclosure indexes instead of their sample distribution. The world distribution of bank
disclosure  indexes  was  obtained  by  calculating  the  disclosure  index  of  10,577  banks  from
Bankscope.23
Equation (17) is estimated by ordinary least squares and by two- stage least squares
to account for the potential endogeneity of equity/total assets, Unsolicited interacted
with  High  disclosure,  and  Unsolicited  interacted  with  (1  -   High  disclosure).  As  in
previous regressions, the instruments consist of the exogenous variables in equation (17)
and country dummies. Since a Durbin- Wu- Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that
OLS delivers consistent parameter estimates (the value of the test statistic is 12.6 with
an associated probability of 0.01), the discussion of Table 8 is based on the 2SLS results.
Looking at Table 8, the estimated coefficients of the first seven explanatory variables
(loan loss provisions/net interest  revenue  to  log of total  deposits)  are close  to those
shown in Table 5, which is not surprising given that equations (1) and (17) are relatively
similar. More interesting are the results for the coefficient of Unsolicited interacted with
High disclosure and Unsolicited interacted with (1 -  High disclosure). I find that the
coefficient  of  the  former  variable  is  insignificant  while  the  coefficient  of  the  latter
variable is significant and equal to - 2.351. These results imply that banks which choose
not to request a rating and which disclose a high amount of public information do not
receive  a lower rating  than  similar banks  which  have solicited  a rating, while banks
which  choose  not  to  request  a  rating  and  which  disclose  a  low  amount  of  public
information receive a rating which is lower than the rating of banks which have asked to
be rated. This finding is consistent with the public disclosure hypothesis.
Even though credit rating agencies generally do not distinguish between solicited and
unsolicited ratings in developed countries, an interesting question is whether the above
results are transferable to European banks. Indeed, Fitch has recently started to develop
internal ratings for Central and Eastern European banks (Fitch, 2005b).
Interestingly, evidence from Bankscope suggests that rated EU- 25 banks have a level
of disclosure comparable to that of rated Asian banks (the disclosure index averages 64.3
for  rated  EU- 25  banks  compared  to  62.9  for  rated  Asian  banks).
19  Moreover,  the
disclosure level of rated EU- 25 banks appears to less homogenous than that of rated
Asian banks (the standard deviation of the disclosure index is equal to 17.0 for rated
EU- 25 banks compared to 14.7 for rated Asian banks). Thus, there may be reason to
believe  that  a  lack  of  public  disclosure  might  also  explain  any  potentially  lower
unsolicited ratings of European banks.
19 These figures are for banks rated by Moody's, S&P, or Fitch.24
6.  Conclusion
This paper investigates whether there is a difference between Fitch’ s solicited and
unsolicited bank ratings and, if so, why. Using ratings assigned to Asian banks, I find no
evidence  that,  in  determining  bank  ratings,  Fitch  assigns  different  weights  across
solicited and unsolicited groups to observable bank characteristics. This result gives some
credence to Fitch’ s claim that the methodology for its unsolicited bank ratings is “ nearly
the  same”   as  for  its  solicited  bank  ratings  (Fitch,  2001).  However,  I  do  find  that
unsolicited  bank  ratings  tend  to  be  lower  than  solicited  ones  after  controlling  for
observable  bank  characteristics.  The  difference  between  both  types  of  ratings  is
economically significant, as it averages 0.9 notches on a 1 to 9 rating scale.
The existence of a difference between solicited and unsolicited ratings has already
been documented for other credit rating agencies. Several explanations are consistent
with such a difference, including the fact that better- quality issuers may request a rating
or that unsolicited ratings do not involve the disclosure of non- public information and, as
a result, may be more conservative than solicited ones. In addition, many issuers also
believe that credit rating agencies assign a lower unsolicited rating to persuade them to
pay for a solicited rating.
In contrast to previous research on the differences in solicited and unsolicited ratings,
the analysis of this paper explicitly controls for potential sample selection by using a
treatment effect model and an endogenous switching regression model to test whether
better- quality  banks  self- select  into  the  solicited  group  (self- selection  hypothesis).
Although the analysis does find a significant difference between solicited and unsolicited
ratings, no evidence is found in favour of the sample selection hypothesis. The analysis
also tests whether the difference between solicited and unsolicited ratings disappears for
banks with unsolicited ratings but which disclose a high enough amount of information
(public  disclosure  hypothesis).  Support  is  found  for  this  hypothesis:  banks  with
unsolicited  ratings  but  a  high  amount  of  disclosure  receive  ratings  that  are  not
significantly different from the ratings of similar banks which have solicited a rating.
The  above- mentioned  findings  are  interesting  for  several  reasons.  First,  possible
measures concerning the use of unsolicited ratings are currently being discussed at the
European  and  U.S.  levels  (SEC,  2003;  European  Commission,  2004).  Although  the
results of this study find no evidence of wrongdoing by Fitch, they support additional
measures designed to clarify the differences between solicited and unsolicited ratings. For
instance, it should be required that credit rating agencies clearly label unsolicited ratings25
as such in their publications and that they make the specific characteristics and the
limitations of this type of ratings, inclusive of the conservative bias documented in this
paper, completely transparent to the public. In this respect, Fitch’ s recent decision to
give up disclosing whether a rating is solicited or not in its regular publications does not
represent  a  step  toward  more  transparency  in  the  credit  rating  industry.  It  also
contradicts the new IOSCO code of conduct for credit rating agencies, which clearly
states that “ each rating not initiated at the request of issuer should be identified as
such”  (IOSCO, 2004).
Second, the New Basel Accord, which is due to be implemented by G- 10 banks at the
beginning of 2007, aims at increasing public disclosure by banks in order to ensure that
market participants can better understand banks’  risk profiles and the adequacy of their
capital  positions  (Basel  Committee,  2004).  It  is  therefore  necessary  that  financial
institution managers understand the need for more disclosure and move in this direction
on their own. This paper provides an incentive for bank managers to disclose information
as it documents the impact of public disclosure on credit ratings and on the relation
between soliciting a rating and the actual rating outcome. Public disclosure not only
appears to have a positive effect on credit ratings, but it also seems to eliminate the
downward bias of unsolicited ratings.
Third, Fitch recently announced that it was about to assign unsolicited ratings to
European  and  U.S.  insurance  companies  “ in  order  to  provide  more  comprehensive
coverage”  in the European and U.S. insurance sectors “ to meet the growing demand”  for
its ratings. In contrast to traditional solicited insurance ratings, these ratings would be
“ generated solely using a statistical model that utilizes financial statement information”
(Fitch, 2004b; Fitch, 2005c). Fitch’ s announcement triggered an immediate reaction from
the German Insurance Industry Association (GDV), which expressed its deepest concerns
and urged Fitch to refrain from publishing any unsolicited ratings unless the new rating
methodology had been “ fully disclosed and widely discussed with the German insurance
industry and the general public”  (GDV, 2004). Fitch replied by clarifying some points
underlying its methodology for unsolicited insurance ratings but decided to press ahead
with the publication of these ratings (Fitch, 2005d). The results of this paper, which
indicate  the  existence  of  a  conservative  bias  in  unsolicited  ratings  of  low  disclosure
banks, suggest that insurance industry associations should be more worried about the
level of public disclosure of their members than by the issuance of unsolicited ratings per
se.26
Finally, it is worth stressing once again that the credit ratings used in this study are
assigned to banks located in Asia. To some extent, this may limit the relevance of the
results of this paper for other contexts. Although this caveat implies that the policy
recommendations should be interpreted with care, the fact that European banks exhibit
a comparable and more dispersed level of public disclosure than Asian banks suggests
that the results could well carry over.27
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Table 1
Distribution of sample bank individual ratings by country
Country                        Solicited     Unsolicited    Total
# % # % # %
Bangladesh 1 0.6 5 3.0 6 3.6
China 1 0.6 15 8.9 16 9.5
Hong Kong 8 4.7 10 5.9 18 10.7
India 4 2.4 28 16.6 32 18.9
Indonesia 10 5.9 2 1.2 12 7.1
Macau 2 1.2 1 0.6 3 1.8
Malaysia 7 4.1 4 2.4 11 6.5
Philippines 11 6.5 2 1.2 13 7.7
South Korea 9 5.3 3 1.8 12 7.1
Taiwan 20 11.8 19 11.2 39 23.1
Vietnam 1 0.6 6 3.6 7 4.1
Total 74 43.8 95 56.2 169 100
The whole sample consists of 169 bank individual ratings assigned by Fitch. Ratings are as of January 31,
2004, and come from Bankscope and Fitch Research. Only those countries that have both solicited and
unsolicited bank individual ratings are included in the sample.
Table 2
Distribution of sample bank individual ratings by rating level
Interpretation                      Solicited     Unsolicited      Total Individual
rating
# % # % # %
 A A very strong bank - - - - - -
 A / B 1 0.6 1 0.6 2 1.2
 B A strong bank 2 1.2 0 0.0 2 1.2
 B / C 11 6.5 3 1.8 14 8.3
 C An adequate bank 17 10.1 14 8.3 31 18.3
 C / D 14 8.3 11 6.5 25 14.8
 D A bank with weaknesses 20 11.8 20 11.8 40 23.7
 D / E 5 3.0 23 13.6 28 16.6
 E A bank with serious problems 4 2.4 23 13.6 27 16.0
 Total 74 43.8 95 56.2 169 100
The whole sample consists of 169 bank individual ratings assigned by Fitch. Ratings are as of January 31,
2004, and come from Bankscope and Fitch Research. See Appendix A for a detailed interpretation of each
rating category.31
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of bank characteristics
Variable Definition Obs Mean    SD  MinMax
Risk management
 Loan loss provisions/Net int. rev. 100 · (Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue) 155 35.4 53.5 - 75.9 312.9
 Impaired loans/Gross loans 100 · (Impaired loans/(Loans + Loan loss reserve)) 123 12.1 15.4 0 97.3
Funding and liquidity
 Net loans/Total assets 100 · (Loans/Total assets) 169 50.7 17.0 - 0.1 91.4
 Liquid assets/Total deposits 100 · (Liquid assets/Customer and short- term funding) 156 39.0 49.7 0.7 471.3
Capitalisation
 Total capital ratio 100 · ((Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/Risk- weighted assets) 140 14.7 12.2 - 12.1 137.8
 Equity/Total assets 100 · (Equity/Total assets) 169 9.3 12.2 - 20.2 84.0
Securitisation
 (no variable found in Bankscope)
Earnings and performance
 Return on assets 100 · (Net income/Total assets) 169 0.5 2.0 - 11.0 7.2
 Cost to income ratio 100 · (Overheads/(Net Interest Revenue + Other Operating
Income))
168 52.1 23.5 14.5 240.3
Market environment
 Consolidated statement 100 if the bank’ s statement is consolidated, 0 otherwise 169 52.1 50.1 0 100
 Unqualified statement 100  if  the  bank’ s  statement  has  been  audited  and  the
accounts  have  been  accepted  by  the  auditors  without  any
remark, 0 otherwise
169 82.1 25.4 0 100
 Commercial bank 100 if commercial bank, 0 otherwise 169 87.0 33.7 0 100
 Communist country 100 if the bank is located in China or Vietnam, 0 otherwise 169 13.6 34.4 0 100
 Sovereign rating long- term Fitch’ s sovereign foreign currency long- term rating coded on
a 20 (AAA) to 1 (D) scale
160 12.8 3.4 7 17
Diversification/franchise
 Total deposits Total deposits (in billion of U.S. $) 160 22.0 61.4 0.0 506.0
 Market share (deposits) 100 · (Total deposits at bank j/Total banking deposits in
the country of bank j)
156 5.5 9.0 0.1 56.6
 Number of branches/Total assets Number of branches/Total assets (in billion of U.S. $) 122 64.3 86.3 1.4 460.1
 Number  of  banks  per  1,000,000
inhabitants
Number of banks in country j/(Total population in country
j/1,000,000)
169 2.7 4.8 0.0 2132
     Table 3. (Continued)
Variable Definition Obs Mean    SD  MinMax
Management and strategy
 Number of directors and managers  Number of directors and managers who are members of the
supervisory  board,  the  board  of  managing  directors,  the
executive committee, and/or the audit committee
131 20.8 12.0 1 70
Corporate governance
 Domestic shareholders 100  if  all  bank  shareholders are  from  the  bank’ s country,
0 otherwise
158 75.9 42.9 0 100
 Percentage of shares owned by: Percentage of bank shares owned by:
   Banks 163 28.1 40.0 0 100
   Individuals/Families 163 2.1 9.8 0 92
   Industrial companies 163 10.4 22.2 0 100
   State/Public authority
  other banks (0 -  100)
  individuals and families (0 -  100)
  industrial companies (0 -  100)
  State and public authority (0 -  100) 163 19.7 35.3 0 100
 Number  of  subsidiaries  majority
owned
Number of bank and non bank subsidiaries majority owned
by the bank
137 4.8 6.1 0 42
Public disclosure
 Disclosure index







where categoryi is equal to 0 if there is no entry in any of the
corresponding sub- categories in Bankscope and 100 otherwise
(some categories receive an extra- weight -  see Baumann and
Nier, 2004).
The  17  categories  include  asset  categories  (loans  by
maturity,  loans  by  type,  loans  by  counterparty,  problem
loans, problem loans by type, securities by type, securities
by  holding  purpose),  liabilities  categories  (deposits  by
maturity,  deposits  by  type  of  customer,  money  market
funding, long- term funding), memo lines categories (reserves,
capital,  contingent  liabilities,  off- balance- sheet  items)  and
income statement categories (non- interest income, loan loss
provision).
169 64.8 12.4 23.8 93.3
The whole sample consists of 169 bank individual ratings assigned by Fitch. Ratings are as of January 31, 2004, and come from Bankscope and Fitch Research.
Variables in the table were selected according to Fitch’ s bank rating methodology (Fitch, 2004a). Statistics include number of observations (Obs), mean (Mean),
standard deviation (SD), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) of each variable. Following Fitch’ s bank rating methodology, the 5- year average of variables (1999
to 2003) is used if available, the 3- year average (2001 to 2003) if not.33
Table 4
Comparison of banks characteristics in the solicited and unsolicited groups
Variables                                       Solicited     Unsolicited     t values
Mean SD Obs Mean SD Obs
Risk management
 Loan loss provisions/Net int. rev. 33.9 69.6 65 36.4 38.3 90 - 0.30
 Impaired loans/Gross loans 14.9 19.6 64 9.1 7.7 59  2.14**
Funding and liquidity
 Net loans/Total assets 48.4 20.5 74 52.6 13.5 95 - 1.59
 Liquid assets/Total deposits 47.7 71.5 70 31.9 15.7 86  1.99**
Capitalisation
 Total capital ratio 17.3 17.0 65 12.5 4.4 75  2.35**
 Equity/Total assets 13.2 17.2 74 6.2 3.9 95  3.81***
Securitisation
 (no variable found in Bankscope)
Earnings and performance
 Return on assets 0.5 2.7 74 0.5 1.0 95 - 0.11
 Cost to income ratio 49.0 21.6 73 54.5 24.7 95 - 1.51
Market environment
 Consolidated statement 62.2 48.8 74 44.2 49.9 95  2.34**
 Unqualified statement 88.3 17.4 74 77.2 29.4 95  2.86***
 Commercial bank 77.0 42.4 74 94.7 22.4 95 - 3.50***
 Communist country 2.7 16.3 74 22.1 41.7 95 - 3.78***
 Sovereign rating long- term 12.9 3.7 71 12.8 3.1 89  0.07
Diversification/franchise
 Total deposits 15.3 27.4 65 26.5 76.3 95 - 1.13
 Market share (deposits) 5.6 6.5 62 5.4 10.4 94  0.11
 Number of branches/Total assets 51.7 96.9 42 70.9 80.1 80 - 1.17
 Number of banks per 1,000,000 inh. 3.3 5.0 74 2.3 4.6 95  1.37
Management and strategy
 Number of directors and managers 19.3 10.0 52 21.8 13.0 79 - 1.17
Corporate governance
 Domestic shareholders 73.5 44.4 68 77.8 41.8 90 - 0.62
 Percentage of shares owned by:
   Banks 33.8 41.7 73 23.4 38.2 90  1.66*
   Individuals/Families 4.3 14.3 73 0.4 1.7 90  2.59***
   Industrial companies 10.9 24.7 73 10.0 20.1 90  0.26
   State/Public authority 9.1 24.3 73 28.3 40.3 90 - 3.57***
 Number of subsidiaries maj. owned 7.0 7.7 59 3.2 3.9 78  3.77***
Public disclosure
 Disclosure index 65.8 11.4 74 64.0 13.1 95  0.94
The whole sample consists of 169 bank individual ratings assigned by Fitch. Ratings are as of January 31, 2004, and come
from Bankscope and Fitch Research. Variables in the table were selected according to Fitch’ s bank rating methodology
(Fitch,  2004a).  Statistics  include mean  (Mean),  standard  deviation  (SD)  and  number  of  observations  (Obs)  of  each
variable. The t- values in the last column refer to the t- statistics of the means between the solicited rating group and the
unsolicited rating group; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.34
Table 5
Determinants of bank individual ratings: ordinary least squares and two- stage least squares
regressions
Independent variables                            Ordinary least squares   Two- stage least squares
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant   0.352   0.326    - 0.561  - 0.426
(0.23) (0.22) (0.31) (0.25)
Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue  - 0.010**   - 0.010**     - 0.009*  - 0.009**
(2.20) (2.35) (1.95) (1.99)
Net loans/Total assets   0.000  - 0.006     0.000  - 0.006
(0.05) (0.79) (0.06) (0.75)
Equity/Total assets   0.038**    0.038     0.048   0.046
(2.07) (1.60) (1.26) (1.15)
Cost to income ratio  - 0.020***   - 0.021***     - 0.018**   - 0.020***
(2.87) (3.29) (2.42) (2.77)
Consolidated statement dummy   0.700***    0.720***      0.694***    0.737***
(3.26) (3.32) (3.08) (3.31)
Communist country dummy  - 1.248***   - 1.438***     - 1.038***   - 1.206***
(3.72) (4.45) (2.84) (3.17)
Log (total deposits)   0.074   0.156*     0.065   0.135
(0.86) (1.67) (0.60) (1.19)
Bank ownership dummy   0.816***    0.580**      0.810***    0.596**
(3.47) (2.35) (3.39) (2.30)
Disclosure index   0.035***    0.030***      0.047***    0.045***
(3.11) (2.99) (3.15) (2.85)
Solicited individual rating dummy   0.866***    1.181***      0.836***    1.173***
(3.94) (3.94) (3.75) (3.89)
Unqualified statement dummy  - 0.303  - 0.505
(0.81) (1.14)
State ownership dummy  - 0.585*  - 0.495*
(1.86) (1.93)
Solicited dummy · Other rating dummy  - 0.643*  - 0.633*
(1.92) (1.89)
Observations 148 148 148 148
Adjusted R- squared 0.58 0.61 0.57 0.60
Classification accuracy (%):
  actual minus predicted rating = 0 31.8 31.8 34.5 29.7
  actual minus predicted rating = - 1 or 1 50.7 52.7 46.6 54.1
  actual minus predicted rating  - 2 or 2 17.6 15.5 18.9 16.2
The dependent variable in each regression is the bank individual rating coded on a 9 (A) to 1 (E) scale. The first
two columns report ordinary least squares estimates which treat equity/total assets and the disclosure index as
exogenous. The last two columns report two- stage least squares estimates obtained by instrumenting equity/total
assets and the disclosure index with the other (exogenous) explanatory variables and country dummies which
reflect  the  average  level  of  the  intrumented  variables  in  each  sample  country.  Robust  t- statistics  are  in
parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.35
Table 6
Determinants of bank individual ratings: treatment effect model
Independent variables                            Two- step   Two- step + IV
Selection  Outcome Selection  Outcome
Constant   0.516   0.176    - 0.101  - 0.693
(0.28) (0.12) (0.05) (0.42)
Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue   0.007*   - 0.011***      0.007  - 0.010**
(1.70) (2.77) (1.54) (2.49)
Net loans/Total assets  - 0.001   0.000    - 0.003   0.000
(0.13) (0.02) (0.29) (0.06)
Equity/Total assets   0.007   0.036*     0.056   0.038
(0.25) (1.66) (1.24) (0.86)
Cost to income ratio   0.001  - 0.020***      0.005  - 0.019***
(0.19) (4.20) (0.74) (3.20)
Consolidated statement dummy   0.804***   0.596**      0.757***    0.559*
(3.09) (2.01) (2.88) (1.87)
Communist country dummy  - 1.170**   - 1.143***     - 1.449**   - 0.855*
(2.15) (2.88) (2.45) (1.70)
Log (total deposits)  - 0.156   0.089    - 0.056   0.070
(1.50) (1.04) (0.46) (0.70)
Bank ownership dummy  - 0.080   0.833***     - 0.051   0.829***
(0.26) (3.27) (0.17) (3.23)
Disclosure index   0.014   0.034***     - 0.006   0.048***
(1.18) (3.41) (0.33) (3.06)
Solicited long- term debt rating dummy    1.060***     0.935***
(2.91) (2.58)
Solicited individual rating dummy   1.214*   1.325*
(1.67) (1.65)
Hazard rate = ȡıe  - 0.225  - 0.260
(0.50) (0.53)
Observations 148 148 148 148
Pseudo R- squared 0.20 0.20
Classification accuracy (%) -  Selection:
  correctly classified 71.6 65.5
Adjusted R- squared 0.54 0.54
Classification accuracy (%) -  Outcome:
  actual minus predicted rating = 0 32.4 34.5
  actual minus predicted rating = - 1 or 1 51.4 50.0
  actual minus predicted rating  - 2 or 2 16.2 15.5
The table reports the results of the treatment effect model. The first two columns report two- step estimates (Heckman, 1979)
which treat equity/total assets and the disclosure index as exogenous. The last two columns report two- step estimates obtained
by  instrumenting  equity/total  assets  and  the  disclosure  index  before  applying  the  two- step  method  (the  instruments  for
equity/total assets and the disclosure index are the same as in Table 5). For each method (two- step and two- step + IV), the
table reports the results of the selection and of the outcome equations. The dependent variable in the selection equation is the
solicited individual rating dummy (1 if solicited, 0 otherwise). The dependent variable in the outcome equation is the bank
individual  rating  coded  on  a  9  (A)  to  1  (E)  scale.  Robust  t- statistics  are  in  parentheses  for  the  two- step  estimates;
bootstrapped t- statistics are in parentheses for the two- step + IV estimates; * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%.36
Table 7
Determinants of bank individual ratings: endogenous switching regression model
Independent variables                          Max. Likelihood   Max. Likelihood + IV
Unsolicited Solicited Unsolicited  Solicited
Constant   1.583  - 1.187     0.140   0.102
(0.71) (0.37) (0.06) (0.02)
Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue  - 0.016**   - 0.015**     - 0.013**   - 0.019**
(2.29) (2.32) (2.12) (2.49)
Net loans/Total assets  - 0.009   0.018    - 0.010   0.022
(0.87) (0.96) (0.87) (0.99)
Equity/Total assets   0.091   0.004     0.075  - 0.066
(1.56) (0.10) (0.67) (0.56)
Cost to income ratio  - 0.018***  - 0.024**     - 0.015  - 0.034**
(2.65) (2.28) (1.48) (1.97)
Consolidated statement dummy   0.750  - 0.266     0.665  - 0.852
(1.39) (0.46) (1.06) (1.42)
Communist country dummy  - 1.472***   1.341    - 0.707   1.639
(2.92) (0.20) (0.76) (0.25)
Log (total deposits)   0.071   0.315*    - 0.008   0.350
(0.56) (1.66) (0.07) (1.13)
Bank ownership dummy   0.659*    0.887     0.601*   0.806
(1.81) (1.56) (1.75) (1.24)
Disclosure index   0.023*    0.034     0.058*   0.036
(1.89) (1.60) (1.86) (0.81)
Standard deviation (İ1) = ı1   0.964***     0.941***
(8.29) (7.36)
Correlation (İ1, u) = ȡ1u   0.131    - 0.114
(0.12) (0.08)
Standard deviation (İ2) = ı2   1.442***   1.838***
(4.99) (6.50)
Correlation (İ2, u) = ȡ2u  - 0.841*  - 0.887*
(1.72) (1.68)
Observations 85 63 85 63
Adjusted R- squared 0.57 0.36 0.59 0.28
Classification accuracy (%):
  actual minus predicted rating = 0 37.7 25.4 38.8 31.8
  actual minus predicted rating = - 1 or 1 51.8 52.4 50.6 47.6
  actual minus predicted rating  - 2 or 2 10.6 22.2 10.6 20.6
The  table  reports  the  results  of  the  endogenous  switching  regression  model.  The  first  two  columns  report
maximum  likelihood  estimates  (Greene,  1995)  which  treat  equity/total  assets  and  the  disclosure  index  as
exogenous. The last two columns report maximum likelihood estimates obtained by instrumenting equity/total
assets  and  the  disclosure  index  before  performing  the  maximum- likelihood  estimation  (the  instruments  for
equity/total assets and the disclosure index are the same as in Tables 5 and 6). The dependent variable in each
equation is the bank individual rating coded on a 9 (A) to 1 (E) scale. Robust t- statistics are in parentheses for
the maximum- likelihood estimates; bootstrapped t- statistics are in parentheses for the maximum- likelihood + IV
estimates; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.37
Table 8
Determinants of bank individual ratings: test of the public disclosure hypothesis
Independent variables                             Ordinary least squares Two- stage least squares
Constant        2.558*        0.902
(1.79) (0.45)
Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue        - 0.012***       - 0.009**
(2.62) (2.02)
Net loans/Total assets        0.001        0.005
(0.10) (0.48)
Equity/Total assets        0.045**        0.084**
(2.12) (1.98)
Cost to income ratio       - 0.021***       - 0.015**
(2.99) (1.99)
Consolidated statement dummy        0.692***        0.702**
(3.17) (2.47)
Communist country dummy       - 1.511***       - 0.659
(5.34) (1.33)
Log (total deposits)        0.145*        0.188*
(1.66) (1.70)
Bank ownership dummy        0.894***        1.048***
(3.56) (3.22)
Unsolicited · High Disclosure       - 0.675**        0.084
(2.60) (0.16)
Unsolicited · (1 -  High Disclosure)       - 1.303***       - 2.351***
(5.30) (3.22)
Observations 148 148
Adjusted R- squared 0.55 0.41
Classification accuracy (%):
  actual minus predicted rating = 0 31.8 27.7
  actual minus predicted rating = - 1 or 1 50.0 46.0
  actual minus predicted rating  - 2 or 2 18.2 26.4
The dependent variable in each regression is the bank individual rating coded on a 9 (A) to 1 (E) scale. The first
column reports ordinary least squares estimates which treat equity/total assets, unsolicited · high disclosure,
and unsolicited · (1 -  high disclosure) as exogenous. The last column reports two- stage least squares estimates
obtained  by  instrumenting  equity/total  assets,  unsolicited ·  high  disclosure,  and  unsolicited ·  (1  -   high
disclosure) with the other (exogenous) explanatory variables and country dummies which reflect the average
level of the intrumented variables in each sample country. Robust t- statistics are in parentheses; * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.38
Appendix A. Fitch’ s individual ratings: definition and scale
Definition:
Individual  Ratings  are  assigned  only  to  banks.  These  ratings,  which  are  internationally
comparable, attempt to assess how a bank would be viewed if it were entirely independent
and  could  not  rely  on  external  support.  These  ratings  are  designed  to  assess  a  bank’ s
exposure  to,  appetite  for,  and  management  of  risk,  and  thus  represent  our  view  on  the
likelihood that it would run into significant difficulties such that it would require support.
The principal factors we analyze to evaluate the bank and determine these ratings include
profitability and balance sheet integrity (including capitalization), franchise, management,
operating environment, and prospects. Finally, consistency is an important consideration, as
is a bank’ s size (in terms of equity capital) and diversification (in terms of involvement in a
variety of activities in different economic and geographical sectors).
Scale:
A  A very strong bank. Characteristics may include outstanding profitability and balance
sheet integrity, franchise, management, operating environment or prospects.
B  A strong bank. There are no major concerns regarding the bank. Characteristics may
include  strong  profitability  and  balance  sheet  integrity,  franchise,  management,
operating environment or prospects.
C  An adequate bank, which, however, possesses one or more troublesome aspects. There
may be some concerns regarding its profitability and balance sheet integrity, franchise,
management, operating environment or prospects.
D  A bank, which has weaknesses of internal and/or external origin. There are concerns
regarding  its  profitability  and  balance  sheet  integrity,  franchise,  management,
operating environment or prospects. Banks in emerging markets are necessarily faced
with a greater number of potential deficiencies of external origin.
E  A bank with very serious problems, which either requires or is likely to require external
support.
Intermediate categories, i.e., A/B, B/C, C/D, and D/E, are also used.
Source: http://www.fitchratings.com/
Appendix B.
Table 9 compares ordinary least squares and ordered probit estimates of equation (1).39
  Table 9
  Determinants of bank individual ratings: ordinary least squares and ordered probit regressions
Independent variables                            Ordinary least squares   Ordered probit
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant   0.352   0.326 - -
(0.23) (0.22) - -
Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue  - 0.010**   - 0.010**     - 0.009**   - 0.011**
(2.20) (2.35) (2.10) (2.40)
Net loans/Total assets   0.000  - 0.006    - 0.003  - 0.012
(0.05) (0.79) (0.45) (1.52)
Equity/Total assets   0.038**    0.038     0.034**    0.031
(2.07) (1.60) (2.09) (1.41)
Cost to income ratio  - 0.020***   - 0.021***     - 0.020***   - 0.023***
(2.87) (3.29) (2.86) (3.43)
Consolidated statement dummy   0.700***    0.720***      0.648***    0.649***
(3.26) (3.32) (3.16) (3.03)
Communist country dummy  - 1.248***   - 1.438***     - 1.312***   - 1.675***
(3.72) (4.45) (3.73) (4.73)
Log (total deposits)   0.074   0.156*     0.053   0.167*
(0.86) (1.67) (0.62) (1.68)
Bank ownership dummy   0.816***    0.580**      0.748***    0.495**
(3.47) (2.35) (3.64) (2.18)
Disclosure index   0.035***    0.030***      0.034***    0.029***
(3.11) (2.99) (3.11) (2.92)
Solicited individual rating dummy   0.866***    1.181***      0.851***    1.220***
(3.94) (3.94) (4.15) (4.17)
Unqualified statement dummy  - 0.303  - 0.004
(0.81) (0.01)
State ownership dummy  - 0.585*  - 0.772*
(1.86) (1.96)
Solicited dummy · Other rating dummy  - 0.643*  - 0.703**
(1.92) (2.19)
Observations 148 148 148 148
Adjusted R- squared 0.58 0.61
Pseudo R- squared 0.24 0.26
Classification accuracy (%):
  actual minus predicted rating = 0 31.8 31.8 34.5 33.1
  actual minus predicted rating = - 1 or 1 50.7 52.7 48.0 49.3
  actual minus predicted rating  - 2 or 2 17.6 15.5 17.6 17.6
The dependent variable in each regression is the bank individual rating coded on a 9 (A) to 1 (E) scale. The first
two columns report ordinary least squares estimates. The last two columns report ordered probit estimates (for
brevity,  estimated  cut  points  of  the  ordered  probit  are  omitted).  Robust  t- statistics  are  in  parentheses;
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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